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POLITICAL ISLAM AND
SECULAR DEMOCRACY
THE RISE OF THE REFAH PARTY IN TURI<EY

BROCK. TAYLOR

Tbe Re/a/J Pm1J' mlfred tbe political {lrellt! ill TlIrkel' {II (I lilJle Jl'ben flie pllblic/elf political parties were IIIJre.rpotlsil'e
alld tbe /!,!Jl'frllIllfllt Jl'as cormpt. The part)' d}(/I!~ed tbe plliJlir:r e:\pec/ri/iolls 0/ politiml parties tbro!(!!,Ii ,!!,({!SJroofs
mIllPa{!!,llil~!!, alld re.rpollsil'f ROl'emiIZ!!,. /~ltllo!(!!,11 tile Relrz/I Part)' Iitls/o!IJld it difliC/llt to/ai/a}}' tbrot(!!,b lJ·it/J IIlall), 0/ it.r
m/lIPa(1!,I1 prolJlisl'.r wilbollt illmrrilZ!!, Im;!!,e costs to tile ,~ol'ertl/J/eJlI, Ibe rise ojflie Reltlli Pm1y /Jas bad a pmjotilid ill/pact
Oil TlIrkisll po/din.

T

he secularization of the Turkish political
s\'stem has left little room for religious organizations to influence governmental institutions.
1\ccess to political power is extremely difficult
for religious organizations. Indeed, the vast gulf
dividing church and state as outlined in Turkey's
secular constitution is seemingly unbridgeable.
The military, seeing themselves as the defender of
Kemal Ataturk's secular democracy, have made the
gulf even wider. I t is under these conditions that
political Islam, embodied in the Refah Party, has
recently emerged upon the Turkish political scene
as an important political player. The Refah Party's
issue-based campaign propaganda and approach
to governing have changed the political system in
Turke\' by increasing the people's expectations
of what government officials ought to deliver:
namely, that government oHicials should act as
representatives of the people, furthering interest
articulation and interest aggregation.

A BRIEF

HISTORY Of' P()LITICS 11\ Tl'RkEY

The polarization of income classes has caused
the Turkish government to become an unrepresentative elitist entity. In fact, Turkey has one of
the ten worst income distributions in the world.!
"The pattern of high income inequality in Turkey
has undoubtedly been exacerbated by the chronically high rates of inflation that have existed over
the past two decades.'" Barry Rubin noted, "The
main political parties are arrogantly unresponsive
to public needs. Government, bureaucracy, and
the political elite view themselves as the society's
master rather than as public servants.'" This elitist
conception, held by most Turkish governmental
officials, has caused governmental corruption to
become the status quo in Turkish politics. Indeed,
scandals and corruption have discredited almost
all of the political parties." In particular, the severe
damage to Turkey's infrastructure caused by the
earthquake of August 1999 illuminated a number
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of corrupt political practices, including the government's failure to enforce building code regulations.'
Although for a number of years the people of
Turkey have been critical of the rampant corruption
and apparent inefficacy of governmental regimes
to represent the rights of the people, little progress
has been made in cleaning up the dark corners of
Turkish politics.
The party system in Turkey has traditionall,"
been deadlocked. The lack of consensus in the
Turkish political
party scene arose
from a seemingh-

A political vacuum
opened the door for the
rise of political Islam as
an alternative to secular
social democracy.

perpetual internal contlict be-

Part\".
In municipal elections on i\larch 27, 1994, the
Refah Party stunned the Turkish political community b" winning 19.1 percent of the national ,-ote.
This strong showing allowed the Refah Party to
capture two hundred man>ralties, including Turke,-'s
two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. After the
earl\" general elections took place on December 24,
1995, the Retah Part\" emerged as Turkey's majorinpolitical part\" with Necmettin Erbakan as the
Prime i\linister, 15H of the 550 parliamentary seats,
and 21.4 percent of the national H>te. Shorth"
thereafter, in what many in Turke\" call a "soft
coup," the Turkish military pushed the Refah Pam"

alternative to secular social democracy.

out of office in June 199 7 . In response to the
demands of the militan', the Constitutional Court
banned the Refah Party on Januan- 16, 19()S, ruling
that the party's religious platform violated Turkey's
secular constitution. However, shortl\" after the
Court's decision, the Islamists reappeared \"et again
as the Virtue Party."
The Virtue Part\" suffered major losses in the
election of 1999, yet the movement remains active
and very much alive. It is interesting to note that
the upcoming ultra-rightist National Action Part\",
which made tremendous gains in the election of
1999, has used the same t'-pe of political rhetoric formerly used by the Refah Part,". Indeed,
the consequences of the Rctah Party's success in
organizing a grassroots political moyement has
had an enormous effect on the Turkish political
system.

TlIF RISE OF POLITIC\L IsLM" II\: TL'RI-':EY

TIlE Rn,\Il P,\RTY'S POLITICAL C\i\II',\IC;l\

Islam as a political platform first emerged on
the Turkish political scene in 1970 with the
formation of the National Order Party, which was
shut down in 1972 b,- the Constitutional Court.
However, shortly after the Court's decision, the
leadership of the National Order Party, headed
by Necmettin Erbakan, reorganized the Islamic
party under a new name, the National Salvation
Party. After the military takeover in 1980, the
National Salvation Party was also closed down by
the military for violating Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, which forbids the use of religious
propaganda for political purposes. Erbakan reemerged upon the Turkish political scene in 1984,

The Refah Party's political campaign was
replete with references to "cleaning up" goyernment. The partl-'s campaign promise of honest and
competent government managed to present itself
as the natural alternative to secular social democrats whose administrations were characterized as
ineHicient, incompetent, and corrupt. I" Some ha,-e
attributed much of the pam-'s strength to the upstanding moral character and personal standing of
the party's leader, Necmettin Erbakan. 11 Furthermore, the Refah Party was able to capitalize upon
voter disillusionment with corrupt center parties
by rhetorical statement in favor of a "i\1oral Order"
and a "Just Economic Order."12 This rhetoric "was

tween competing
elitist entities." 1\S
a result, party
politics have consistently failed to translate voter demands into
public policY.- Other apparent results included voter
disillusionment and a "corresponding erosion in
social rights, including both a decline in the bargaining capacit" of labor unions as well as a
reduction in the degree of entitlement to key social
sen-ices in the areas of education, health, and
social security.'" The increasing inability of the
state to cater to the demands of its constituency,
especially the demands of the poor, the disadvantaged, and excluded minority groups, created
a political vacuum. This political vacuum opened
the door for the rise of political Islam as an
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establishing his third Islamic coalition, the Refah
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accentuated by the part\'\ attempt to portra\'
itself as pious i\luslims motivated by thc fear of
Allah,I'
The traditional weakness of Islamic movcments in Turke\' indicates that the appeal of
political Islam as an alternative to secular social
democrac\' arises not only from the strength of
its moral argument in fm'or of equity, but also
from specific and concrete campaign tactics and
political strategies used by the party, II The rise of
the Refah Party as an important political player
in Turke\' was facilitated by a highly organized,
grassroots political campaign, including highh'
rhetorical political propaganda and target-oriented
pre-election incentives,
OR(;\l\;U\TI()K\L C\:\]I',\]C;" STR.\TH;]I:S

The Refah Part\"s organizational strength
proved to pLw an important role in intluencing the
electorate, thus facilitating the election of Refah
officials to offices of intluence. Paradoxicalh', in
an age where the mass media established itself as
the dominant mode of communication, the Refah
Party placed major emphasis on grassroots organizations and face-to-face contact with the electorate. The political campaign of 1994 exhibits the
strength of the Refah Party's organizational tactics.
\\'omen went door to door handing out tliers,
soliciting support for Refah candidates. Party
supporters sought out and spoke directly with
members of the electorate likeh' to support the
Refah movement, persuading individual voters to
jump on the Refah Party bandwagon. Candidates
were out among the people expressing their view
and receiving feedback from their constituenC\·.
The part!· gave enormous attention to step-by-step
mobilization of local party representatives, with
parh' militants diligently coming into personal contact with potential voters. These contacts gradually
built support for the party b!' establishing close,
personalized relationships. Computer technology
was exploited to accumulate and process information on people likely to vote for the party. These
organizational tactics afforded strategic advantages
to the Refah Part\· over all other political parties,
especially over the social democrats who were
in organizational disarray and clearh' disregarded
issues relating to voter mobilization at the grassroots leveL I.

The grassroots tactics of the Refah Parh' proved
to be extremely effective in motivating the electorate to support Refah Part\' candidates. In addition,
by speaking directly to the electorate and by
becoming connected with their constituency, Refah
Parh' officials became conscientious of the indi\'iduals the\' were to represent. This awareness, in
turn, led to responsible governing and attempts to
truly act as civil servants. Refah Party leaders gained
widespread recognition for their effective performance on a local leveL In fact, in Refah-controlled
municipalities, the party gained a reputation for
honest, clean government. However, this reputation was not without blemishes. Mayor Erdogan,
a member of the Refah Parh', admitted that even
after four \'Cars in office he was unable to completely eliminate bribery in a municipalit\" that
emplO\'s more than 3(),()()() workers. In total, eight
mayors associated \vith the Refah Parh" were investigated for corruption. I" However, the number
of Refah Part\' officials accused of corruption was
considerabh' low
when compared to
other political parties. l - Indeed, "for
the most part, Refah mayors have
been more eftlcient
and less corrupt
than their predecessors."'~

These

The rise of the Refah Party
as an important political
player in Turkey was
facilitated by a highly
organized grassroots
political campaign,
including highly rhetorical
political propaganda and
target-oriented
pre-election
.
.
IncentIveS.

general trends demonstrate the Refah Party's connectivity with their
constituency.
The Refah Par- '--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'
ty's ideological populism and grassroots organizational tactics tapped into the people's desire to
organize and express themselves politically. "In
essence, the populist party serves as the missing
emotive and cultural nexus between actors within
the state and the larger strata of society. The Refah
Party", populist par excellence, has played exactly
such a role in Turkey."I" By providing a vehicle for
the Turkish people to voice their views and express
their opinions regarding political issues of concern
to them, the Refah Party has dramatically altered
the political system in Turkey. The emergence of
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this simple form of interest articulation, previously
enjoyed only b," the elite, was a revolutionary
phenomenon in that by empCl'.vering the individual
it laid the groundwork for redirecting political
power back to the masses. Through this process,
many individuals realized the intluence that they
can assert through active involvement in the
political system. ~ow that the voice of the people
has been heard, it will be diftlcult for other political parties to gain access to political power \vithout
also pro\"iding a mechanism where constituents
can voice grievances and feel that they are being
heard.
RIIET( lRIC\L

candidates were able to gain support from voters
otherwise unlikel\, to support the Islamists.'"
The municipal elections of i\larch 27, 1994,
also demonstrated Refah's commitment to inc1usionar\' politics and the vocalization of social
issues, such as clean government, waste disposal,
and prohibition of pornographic tllms and programs on television." 1,," focusing on issues directly
affecting the electorate, the Refah Party set a new
standard for Turkish politicians. Previously, political
parties primarih" focused campaigns on oraton° of
oftlcials' attributes while arrogantly ignoring issues
affecting the electorate. The Refah Party, on the
other hand, has now effectivel\' modeled representative rhetoric. A suftlcient number of citizens
caught the \"ision of what the Refah Party was

C\j\W \1(;1\

To complement their grassroots organizational
trying to do: address the
tactics, the Refah Party efconcerns of their confectiveh" used highly rhetoristituency. Subsequenth",
cal political propaganda to
campaIgn rhetoric In
gain support for their coTurkel' became far more
alition. The 1991 campaign,
issue-oriented. The Turkorchestrated bl" some of the
ish people have since
young I slamist intellectuals
used their votes to reand campalgn managers,
ward candidates who efshowed the Refah Party's
fectively address major
commitment to addressing
political issues; the electhe issues. The political campaign was conducted on ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' torate, conversely, has
also withheld their votes from candidates and
billboards, on television, and 1n the press. Depolitical parties who fail to communicate their
pictions of human protlles and social issues of

The "Just Order"
emphasized income
distribution and the
moral obligation of
the state to improve the
economic conditions
of the poor.

concern to Turkish citizens were extremeh"
prevalent. These depictions included young men
searching for jobs, a female student (wearing
the traditional head scarf) longing to attend her
university classes, a retired man asking for a better
standard of living, and a middle-aged woman
(without a headscarf) promoting environmental
awareness. The portrayal of a noncovered woman
poignantly attests to the party's inclusionary
strategy. The entire campaign incorporated an
inclusionary tone focused on issue-based politics.
Conversely, other political parties based their
electoral campaigns on the personal attributes of
their leaders. The Refah Party's choice to focus
on issues of local importance enabled the party to
gain the support of many voters who would
have otherwise been skeptical of an Islamic party.
Furthermore, by using each part of their campaign to target specific social groups, Refah Party
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position in regards to societal problems."
Pt 'BLlSIIFD

C\;\II',\I(;:-':

The Refah Party's use of verbal rhetoric to
address and respond to the issues is unprecedented
in Turkish politics. Additionalh", the Refah Party
took another step forward by making their political
agenda available to the public in writing. This is
evident by. the election manifesto booklet issued b,"
"

the Refah Party for the December 1995 election. In
this booklet, the Refah Party addressed and presented a number of concrete solutions relating to
the Kurdish population in Southeast Turkey. These
measures included the repopulation of evacuated
villages, a specitic program for the economic
development of the region, the repeal of the state
of emergency rq.,'Ulation, and lifting the trade embargo imposed on lral] by the United Nations.'; B,"
addressing these issues directly and also presenting

BROCk TAYLOR

had become alienated from the Turkish political
concrete solutions, the Refah Party gained the
sl'stem. T Indeed, the economic theories of the
support of a majority of kurdish citizens.
"Just Order" rna\' have been "stronger in colorful
Catering ones' political campaign toward a
rhetoric than in substance,"'" but the importance of
certain group of minorities is another revolutionan"
this portion of the Refah Pam"'s campaign is not
model in Turkish politics. This model has since been
the soundness of their economic ideas. Instead, it
successfulh" replicated b\ many prominent political
is the remarkable manner in which they worked
parties in Turkel' and is, in turn, becoming an
toward the betterment of Turkey's standard of
important part of the Turkish political process.
living, not onh" b," vocally addressing specific issues
Uwing to the plurality of political parties in Turkey,
but also bl' formulating specific strategies that
minorin" groups are growing more and more
were
attractive to the people.'" This is representaintluencial in political circles. In response, a number
of minorities have organized themselves into active
tive government at its 6nest.
The Turkish people recognized and responded
interest groups." The degree to which these interest
to the Refah Part\·'s revolutionary model. Abdulgroups will replace existing elites as powerful politibaki Erdogmus, a r";'urdish citizen, stated, "Refah
cal pla,"ers is a matter yet to be determined. It is
is the onll' political partl' which is outside the SI'Simportant, however, to recognize the profound
effect the Refah model , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , tern, and it can fulfill the
has pla,"ed in facilitating a
political ,,"stem in which
interest groups are becoming intluential plm"ers In
national politics.
TilE "Jlsr ORDER"

The Refah Part\" developed a concise economic plan that directly
addressed the concerns of

All other political parties
in Turkey find themselves
being judged according
to the Refah Party's
hi'gh e r st an dard 0 f
listening and responding
bli
to pU c opinion.

changes we desire . . .
justice and freedom under
the guarantee of law.";"
Another Turkish citizen
stated, "The Refah Party
spent more time and energy discussing equality,

social security, welfare,
and social justice than any
other political party, inL-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--1
cluding the leftist parties.";[
This clearly shows that people acknowledged and
the lower income classes regarding the distribution
appreciated the Refah Party's effort to reform the
of wealth and income. In their campaign, Refah
political
system in Turkey. By discussing the issues
Party candidates focused upon the party's goal
of concern to the people, the Retah Party has raised
of establishing a "Just Economic Order" (adi!
the standard for political responsiveness; the people
ekullulJlik dIlZetl). The 'Just (hder" was made up of
of Turkey are now requiring more from their
thirty-one articles dealing with socioeconomic
elected officials. Expressly, Turkish citizens are
issues. Refah Part'" candidates used the economic
now demanding governmental officials that not
theories encompassed in the "Just Urder" to
only vocalize the issues but also produce plans to
rhetorically emphasize income distribution and
effectively deal with the issues. Dr. Mehran
the moral obligation of the state to improve the
Kamrava states that, owing to the Retah Party, "the
economic conditions of the poor, disabled, and
level of public scrutiny of the government has
disad\"antaged. Furthermore, the "Just Order" was
greatly increased."" Furthermore, as a result of the
used to emphasize the importance of free enterRetah Party's political campaign strategies, Turkish
prise, private investment, and commercial activity,
citizens
are now demanding that political parties
thus minimizing the role of the state"'; Although its
use their campaigns not only to address but also to
economic promises might have been intlationary if
present solutions for the ills that affect society.
put into practice, the "Just Order" was exactly
what the average Turk wanted to hear.'" In fact,
the Retah Party's political discourse of the "Just
Order" became extremely popular among the
poor, especially among I";'urdish populations who

ATfEi\Wr T( 1 p( lRTRAY A SECl'L\RIZED POUnC\L ISLAM

During the 1996 election, the Refah Party
focused on portraying themselves as a modern
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political party. Refah Party candidates appeared on
television debates without any of the prominent
indicators normally associated with an Islamic
movement (no beards, for example). Additionally,
candidates were attentive to appear well dressed by
\Xiestern standards." By adjusting their apparel to
conform to the secular tastes of the electorate, the
Refah Party showed their commitment to representing and including all Turkish citizens. Although
this is a minor detail, it is ne,"ertheless quite remarkable that Refah Party candidates listened to
public opinion and responded by conforming
personal practices. This responsiveness is extraordinary because other political parties haye continued to keep themselves aloof from public
opinion, focusing instead upon the attitudes of the
elites. '" The Refah Party has again established an
important paradigm. Due to the positive actions of
the Refah Party in responding to public opinion, all
other political parties in Turkey find themseh-es
being judged according to the Refah Party's higher
standard of listening and responding to public
optnlon.

An additional factor that aided the rise of
the Refah Party was its incentive-based campaign.
Indeed, the Refah Party supplied their constituents
with more pre-election incentives and post-election
services than their secular competitors. These inkind incentives that
the Refah Part\· municipal candidates
distributed generously among the
poor right before
the March 1994 municipal elections and
the general election
of December 1995 had tremendous effects in
shifting voters' support toward Refah Party candidates. Muzaffer Dogan, the Refah Party mayor of
Bahcelievler, distributed 1,500 tons of coal during
the winter months to the poor, 2S0-kilogram
grocery packages during the holy month of
Ramadan to 3,S()0 families, clothing for 100
university students, and even paid for the circumcision ceremonies of 1,000 children. Additionally,
"Mehmet Sekmen, the Refah Party mayor of Kartal,

Fifty-seven percent of
the 2,722 Turkish
respondents did not
think they could criticize
the government.
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reportedly distributed not onh- coal and groceries
to prospective voters, but also money and gold
coins. Furthermore, Refah Party n1a\'ors have also
provided clothing and soup for the poor.;' These
in-kind incentives were not just an attempt to gain
political support. The\' also represent the Refah
Party's attempt to respond to the demands of their
constituenc\-. This response is another important
breakthrough, in that Turkey's other political
parties "fail to translate voter demands into public
policy." In fact, "except for Refah, there is little
ideological or programmatic difference between
the parties.";" I ndeed, "as the income di"ide further
widens, the only civil organization to work with the
economicalh- disadvantaged sectors of society en
masse is the Refah Party."'- Although the purit\· of
the Retah Part\"s moti,'es in helping the neech' right
before a major election ma\' be questionable, one
cannot deny the fact that the Refah Party did make
significant efforts to both identit\, and assist the
poor and disadvantaged.
The tact that Refah officials recognized a number of social problems and made concerted efforts
in response to these social ills sa\'s much about the
Refah Party's approach to representative governing. As a Turkish journalist, Dogu Ergil, puts it,
"Refah is the vehicle that is carrying the marginal,
downtrodden, and neglected to the center of
power. 1t will never lose its grip because these
people were not represented before. No [other]
political part\' represents the people at the political
level or the popular level and there are no [other]
grass-roots organizations to intluence the state.";'
Again, Refah's ability to respond to public opinion
that translated into effective public poliC\" has increased the people's expectations of how government oHicials should act in office.
AI'I'R( lAClI T( l

G( l\,ERl\:I~(;

Refah Party officials' performance tn oHice
demonstrates the part\-'s commitment to representative governing. Many Refah ma\'ors have instituted important administrative mechanisms such
as "peoples' councils," where mayors and other
government officials meet with constituents once
a week to hear their grievances. '" Government
officials inviting criticism is a revolutionary phenomenon in Turkey. This is particularly impressive
when contrasted with the results of a recent

BROCK TAYLOR
political poll that found that 57 percent of the
2,"722 Turkish respondents did not think the\' could
criticize the government.''' 13\, their success in
ad,'ancing interest articulation and interest aggregation, Refah mayors have raised the bar for what
constitutes a "successful record" for a ma\'o[. Subsequently, the future mayors of Turkey, regardless
of their party affiliation, will be held to a higher
standard."
Commentators agree that politicians who can
effectively address and deal with the metropolitan
phenomena of garbage, potholes, and mud will win
reelection. The major political parties have tended
to a,'oid these subjects. However, Refah Party
politicians not only made campaign promises to
deal with the filth, but they also followed through
by cleaning up a number of Turkish cities. In
January 1997, an observer reported that in
municipalities controlled b\, the Refah Part\'
"busses run, the garbage is collected, and social
services in general hm'C improved,"" In addition,
a journalist from the ClwiJtiali .\'cifllte }\[ollitor
commented on the changes that have occurred in
the Refah-run municipality of Sincan since the
Refah gm'ernment took oHice: "Three years ago
this town was known as 'i\\ud Sincan,' because of
neglect from pre"ious secular local gm'Crnments,
which residents say were corrupt, but Sincan today
is well-paved, boasting green areas and a huge
children's park, and most people have water."" In
Istanbul, reporters have noticed that "rubbish is
collected regularly. Trees have been planted and
better coal has been introduced to replace the foul
lignite responsible for the Istanbul winter smog.""
The Refah Party's commitment to action is
unprecedented in Turkish politics, These small acts,
directed toward the betterment of living conditions
in Turkey, have accomplished a greater good for
society in that "people's expectations of what the
state ought to deliver are increasing."" This change
is owed to Refah's representative policies.
However, the Refah Party's comparativeh'
superior service record did not come without
accompanying costs to society. In fact, taxpayers
arc now picking up the bill for many of the Refah
Party's municipal improvement projects, through
substantial price inflation on basic staples such as
bread and gasoline. Furthermore, the Refah Party's
use of government funding for popular subsides

has left the Social Securit\' Administration heavily
indebted to foreign creditors.'''
j\dditionally, despite the Refah Part\''s implementation of mam' successful policies, the\' have
failed to come through on a number of important
campaign promises. The longer Refah oHicials were
in oHice, the more ap- r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
parent it became to
Turkish citizens that
the Refah Party's rhetoric was based more
on symbolism than on
substance."- Furthermore, the Refah Party's attempt to appease
the
powers-that-be
caused the movement
to abandon mam' of
its basic principles."

The Islamic theme of
championing the
periphery against the
center and the
particularism of Islamic
culture has become a
source of identity for the
youth of Turkey.
L ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----"

For example, although the part\' was somewhat
successful in eliminating old-fashioned bribery, it
has since been replaced with "voluntary contributions" to party organizations and the directing of
municipal contracts to party faithful. Refah Party
oftlcials demonstrated that they are not above such
abuses of power. 1" However, when the positive and
negative of the Refah Party's approach to governing are aggregated, one must conclude that the
Refah Party played an important role in changing
Turke\"s political system for the better. This is
especially evident when the Refah Party's approach
to governing is compared with that of other
Turkish political parties.""
DFYFL()Pi\IEI\:T

()r:

CIVIL S()CIETY

Turkish political anah'st Dr. Debbie Lovatt
noted, "Since the Islamist Welfare Party led by
Necmettin Erbakan came to power in July 1996
following the 1995 elections, a young but dynamic
civil society has been particularly apparent."il The
rise of newly formed civil organizations, independent of traditional political parties, is strong evidence of the intluential role the Refah Party played
in increasing the expectations Turkish citizens have
for their government officials. Indeed, by creating
an environment where government officials were
accessible and responsive to public demand, the
Refah Party has encouraged the creation of civil
society groups. In particular, the resurgence of
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labor parties in Turkey is a notable ad,"ancement.
The labor strike of March 6, 1999, is an important
example of the power civil society groups have
gained. ~'ork halted as 5,()()(J workers demonstrated
in the streets of Ankara. The~' demanded the right
to negotiate pay b\' means of collective bargaining.
l\lthough the government later consented to a
20 percent pay raise, it was later obliged to promise
an additional 10 percent raise in October." The
results of this strike (nameh' that the people spoke
and the government responded) are remarkable,
especially when contrasted with the attitudes of
government official prior to the Refah Party's
ascendence to power. The resultant pa,' raises
obtained through the strike of March 6 clearly
demonstrate the changes that have occurred and
are continuing to occur as a direct result of the
Refah Partl·'s approach to representative governing.
TIIF n'Tl'RF

or

P()UTIC\L ISL\]\[ 1:\ T\ 'RI":FY

Although the Refah Party was pushed out of
office, and its daughter organization, the Virtue
Party, suffered major losses in the election of 1999
(ironically due to Virtue Party officials inability to
rise to the level of popular expectation left by the
Retah Party), the Islamic movement has renewed
hopes." The Islamic theme of championing the
periphery against the center and the particularism
of Islamic culture has become a source of identity
for youth of Turkey. In fact, a recent surve,' found
that 45 percent of those who voted for the Islamic
partl· were between the ages of fourteen and
thirty-four. By contrast, most of those who voted
for the social democratic parties were over the age
of thirty-five. The Turkish Generation X seems
to be oriented toward the Islamic movement.
Additionally, if the economy continues to falter, it
may provide an opening for the Islamic opposition
to revive its fortunes. i.
The success of the Refah Party has permanently changed the political system in Turkey. Even
if the Islamists are unable to regain the political
prominence they once enjoyed, their mark upon
Turkish politics will remain. The Refah phenomenon has created a political climate in Turkey where
political parties are expected to more fully represent the interests of their constituencies and
also provide a greater number of much-needed
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services. B\· responding to the demands of the
people of Turkey, Refah has engendered in their
constituencies an understanding of the power the
people may possess if they are well organized and
effectively voice their concerns. This understanding
has translated into a political society where interest
articulation and interest aggregation are tar more
prevalent than ever before. The consequences of
the Refah Party's success in organizing a grassroots
political movement will continue to be felt in future
elections.
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